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2249 
Introduction to Spontaneous Order and 
Emergence of New Systems of Property 
Yun-chien Chang & Richard A. Epstein 
The Spontaneous Order and Emergence of New Systems of Property 
Symposium was organized by the Classic Liberal Institute, New York University 
(“NYU”), and was held on November 14 and 15, 2014, at NYU. We thank the 
editors of the Iowa Law Review for their diligent and able work in rounding 
out the Essays from the Symposium for publication. 
The theme of this Symposium is obviously inspired by Friedrich A. Hayek, 
a Nobel Laureate in economics and one of the most eminent classic liberal 
thinkers of all time. Hayek developed the term “spontaneous order” 
(probably coined by Michael Polanyi)1 into an elaborate theory,2 which he 
used to explain the social phenomenon of cooperation. The purpose of this 
theory was to demonstrate how a decentralized system, which relied on local 
and dispersed information held by a large number of different and unrelated 
players, could be brought together through the operation of the price 
mechanism. The genius of this system is that no person who participates in 
that system has to inquire into the private purposes of his trading partner. It 
is enough that he knows that the other side thinks that it is better off by the 
exchange. The system thus produces more reliable decisions at lower cost, 
from which Hayek deduced that this simple mechanism could outperform a 
centralized system, which was in vogue after the Second World War, when 
Hayek developed his theory. As private law scholars, we are interested in how 
private bargaining, contracting, and local custom shape the property regimes 
over different types of assets in various legal systems. It is for this reason that 
the Essays in this Symposium examine the different forms of property rights: 
those that are legal or customary, formal or informal, and de jure and de 
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 1. See CHRISTINA PETSOULAS, HAYEK’S LIBERALISM AND ITS ORIGINS: HIS IDEA OF 
SPONTANEOUS ORDER AND THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 2 (2013). 
 2. See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
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facto. The Essays examine these various permutations in the context of the 
property rights regimes in the U.S., Europe, and East Asia. 
As developed in the Essays collected in this issue, the big picture appears 
to lend support to Hayek’s general approach. Many new property 
arrangements did arise from spontaneous order, and many of these are 
efficient. Nonetheless, it is important not to be carried away by the notion that 
spontaneous order explains the full range of property rights systems. Bottom-
up approaches often give us a good first approximation to the basic elements 
of a property system. But this conclusion does not always hold without 
qualification, for often times statutory rules are used to supplement and 
clarify customary rules whose exact parameters may remain uncertain. 
Below we group the Symposium Essays, summarize the gist of each, and 
point out the relations among them. 
Two Essays focus on the spontaneous order in the area of natural 
resources. Bryan Leonard and Gary Libecap provide a framework that enables 
us to understand the de facto, informal property rights in open-access 
regimes. They argue that de facto property rights in natural resources 
spontaneously emerge and maintain when users are heterogeneous and 
resources are both ample and heterogeneous. These initial conditions create 
search and production advantage for certain infra-marginal users. The rise of 
such spontaneous rights causes the open-access regime to persist longer, if the 
initial de facto property rights cannot be easily converted to de jure property 
rights. Oil, gas, and fishery offer examples of natural resource regimes used 
to bolster their claims. 
Dean Lueck and Karen Bradshaw Schultz, in their joint work, discuss how 
landowners use contracts to govern landscape-level resources, such as wildlife 
habitats, scenic vistas, and firescapes. The optimal size of managing landscape-
level resources is usually larger than individual parcels—thus can also be 
described as “semicommons,”3 as farming or cattle raising is better conducted 
separately on individual plots whereas managing wild fire, for example, is 
more efficient and effective when done collectively. Transaction costs are 
critical in determining whether private bargaining is capable of leading to 
some spontaneous order or degenerates into anarchical disorder. More 
specifically, homogenous land use tends to reduce transaction costs, echoing 
the conclusion of the Leonard and Libecap Essay. 
Related, but at a more abstract level, Lee Anne Fennell studies the 
establishment and sustainability of spontaneous order in managing commons 
and preventing rent dissipation. Fennell argues that resource needs to be 
properly segmented—or, divided into appropriate units—to reduce 
 
 3. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 
2011); Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 131 (2000).  
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governance burden and produce convergence between private and social 
cost–benefit calculus. Property features can be lumpy4—or, discrete rather 
than continuous—and thus certain externalities can be irrelevant, as 
divergence of private costs/benefits from social ones may still produce 
efficient results. With the proper segmentation of a given resource, its most 
efficient use may emerge spontaneously. In the two Essays related to natural 
resources, resource segmentation, such as setting the limit for the minimal 
size of land, is crucial in facilitating private bargaining and transformation of 
de facto property rights to de jure property ones. 
Several Essays, not surprisingly, touch on the numerus clausus principle5 
and related issues. The numerus clausus principle states that numbers of 
property forms in any given asset are found on some closed list, such that it 
falls on the legislature to create new forms. This principle, when interpreted 
and enforced in its strictest sense, impedes the spontaneous emergence of 
new property forms, which are then ratified by judicial decision. In this 
Symposium, Yun-chien Chang and Henry Smith revisit the economic theory 
of the numerus clausus principle in order to lay new foundations in favor of 
optimal standardization. But they also caution against total rigidity, noting as 
their reference point that the civil law jurisdictions, which introduced the 
numerus clausus principle, tend to have too few property forms. After 
elaborating an information cost theory of property custom, Chang and Smith 
connect these two separate literatures together and thereafter point out that 
customary properties could be a safety valve when the numerus clausus 
principle confronts an inactive legislature. Drawing on the examples of 
customary properties in East Asia, especially those in Taiwan, they specify the 
underlying conditions for the emergence of new property forms. 
A strict form of the numerus clausus principle is explicitly adopted in 
China. Shitong Qiao and Frank Upham, however, offer convincing evidence 
based on field work that, notwithstanding this apparent prohibition on the 
informal creation of new forms, an important de facto property right, “small 
property,” emerges nonetheless. More specifically, they show that residential 
buildings have been constructed in violation of building code and zoning law, 
which renders them non-registrable. Nonetheless, the want of an official legal 
pedigree has not stopped high volumes of transactions in these units, even 
though purchasers cannot receive legal title to buildings that under the 
formal law may be torn down anytime. Indeed, about half of the buildings in 
 
 4. For more discussion on this idea, see Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1955 (2012). 
 5. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373 (2002); Thomas W. 
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus 
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000); Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 3, at 148. 
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Shenzhen, China (the fourth largest city in China) are small properties.6 Qiao 
and Upham also challenge the central role that the law and economics 
approach gives to the right to exclude, by proposing instead a relational 
theory of property. Their relational theory defends an in personam bundle-of-
rights conceptualization of property that emphasizes the key role of social 
norm and social practice—a spontaneous order—in establishing property 
rights, particularly in developing countries. 
Lee Alston and Bernardo Mueller’s Essay, titled Towards a More 
Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights, pays homage to Harold Demsetz’s seminal 
1967 article.7 Their work takes Darwinian “evolution” theory seriously. The 
unit of selection in their analysis is the design of property rights8 (i.e. the 
bundle of rights9) and the fitness refers to the perpetuation of this bundle 
design over time.10 The potential combinations of sticks in any potential 
bundle are essentially infinite. The original set of rights in a practical bundle 
is likely to emerge spontaneously. Property rights with sticks that operate 
independently of each other tend to yield optimal results. While the authors 
do not explicitly discuss the numerus clausus principle, it nonetheless works in 
the background as a way to greatly limit the possible combination of sticks 
that are observed in practice. That is, the workable bundles of rights11 are 
limited in ways that might shape the evolution of property rights. 
Richard Epstein then seeks to link the notion of spontaneous order to 
the emergence of natural law, that is, law that emerges without the conscious 
guidance of the state. In dealing with these rules, Epstein notes that the want 
of centralized enforcement tends to limit customary rules to one of two forms: 
either individuals share with each other on a pro rata basis, as open access to 
rivers and waters or the creation of riparian water rights. Alternatively, the law 
can gravitate toward systems of absolute priority, as with ownership in land, 
under which prior in time is higher in right. But as resource use becomes 
 
 6. See Shitong Qiao, Small Property, Big Market: A Focal Point Explanation, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 
(forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399675. 
 7. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). 
 8. An alternative way of testing the evolution theory of property law is to use “property 
forms” as the selection unit. Certain ancient forms, first championed by the Romans, such as 
ownership, usufruct, servitude and mortgage, withstand the challenge of 2000 years, while fading 
away are forms such as fee tail and dian (an ancient Chinese property form that is now rarely used 
Taiwan and was intentionally left out of the China Property Law of 2007). The former groups of 
rights can be characterized as survival of the fittest (they tend to be general and flexible).  
 9. For a recent defense of property as a bundle of rights, see Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-
Rights Theory as a Bulwark against Statist Conceptions of Private Property, 8 ECON J. WATCH 223 (2011). 
 10. For related discussions of why “styles” in common and civil property law persist, see Yun-
chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1 (2012); Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, Structure and Style in Comparative 
Property Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (Giovanni B. 
Ramello & Theodore Eisenberg eds., forthcoming 2015). 
 11. See Yun-chien Chang, The Economy of Concept and Possession, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
POSSESSION 103 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015). 
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more intensive, often more complex systems of rights emerge, but these 
require the formation of a given state regime that should seek to strengthen 
the rules of acquisition, protection, and transfer that emerged in the early 
common law systems. 
 Two Essays demystify common belief or conjecture regarding certain 
spontaneous orders. Emily Kadens’s Essay explains the operation of the 
extended credit network that emerged in pre-modern Europe. Kadens 
contends that reputation is not always sufficient to form to sustainable credit 
arrangements, as the prior literature has assumed. To be sure, transparency 
and honesty of the debtors and the confidence of the creditors motivated 
much of the lending for a few centuries. But another mechanism—the setoff 
of accounts moving in opposite directions among traders—was operative as 
well. Every person in the pre-modern society was a creditor and a debtor at 
the same time, throughout his or her life. Government intervention through 
traditional legal remedies increased in importance as the size of lending 
transactions, and the communities in which they were made became too large 
for these control mechanisms to work without supplementation. 
Ruoying Chen demonstrates that new property arrangements can 
emerge spontaneously in the most unlikely field of eminent domain. Chen 
describes the rise of an idiosyncratic phenomenon in China—invited takings. 
That is, the government would not make an offer to purchase real properties 
owned by private citizens, unless a supermajority (often 90%) of property 
owners in a community had invited the government to condemn their 
properties. The government is not bound to make offers to purchase a call 
option from these property owners, and these owners are not committed to 
accept the offers. The amount of compensation is standardized and 
formulaic, thus avoiding corruption. The invited takings regime in China in 
many ways resembles the land assembly district design advanced by Michael 
Heller and Roderick Hills in the U.S.12 Chen’s detailed description of the 
institutional details in China and careful theoretical analysis demonstrate that 
a spontaneous voluntary takings regime can work under certain institutional 
conditions. 
Finally, Georg von Wangenheim and Fernando Gomez make the case for 
complex rules in nuisance law. Since Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s 
seminal 1972 article,13 many writers have sought to figure out the best way to 
allocate and protect entitlements from these nontrespassory invasions. The 
two of us in our separate writings have generally preferred simpler rules, 
including a legal regime that makes injunctive relief the primary remedy in 
property law.14 In their Essay, Wangenheim and Gomez contends that their 
 
 12. See Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (2008). 
 13. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 14. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); Richard A. 
Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997); 
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more complex rules do better to regulate nuisance law as it develops in Spain, 
Germany, and the U.S. 
It should be evident that these Essays look at many different facets of 
property law, and often approach them from many different points of view. 
But throughout the effort is to figure out the correct mix of entitlements and 
remedies that allow us to shape profitable interactions both among ordinary 
individuals and with government in a way that works to raise the overall 
standard of living and liberty for all persons. 
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